



Norwegian University of  
Science and Technology

# SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS 1

TTM4205 – Lecture 7

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# Reference Group

I am looking for one more student to form a reference group for this course, preferably a student from KOMTEK.

We are planning to organize the first meeting in 1-2 weeks.

# ChipWhisperer

You need a ChipWhisperer Starter Kit Level 1 to be able to complete all of the weekly problems related to side-channel attacks. Get in touch with me if you do not have a set yet.

It is allowed to work together in pairs to complete these problems, while the others must be solved individually.

# Thursday Lab

The next four Thursdays will be lab-sessions where we will help you with the ChipWhisperer problems.

The next Thursday lecture is October 12th. There will be normal lectures on Tuesdays.

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# Black Box Crypto

We design the security of a cryptographic scheme to follow Kerckhoff's principle: if everything about the scheme, except for the key, is known, then the scheme should be secure.



# Black Box Crypto

We design the security of a cryptographic scheme to follow Kerckhoff's principle: if everything about the scheme, except for the key, is known, then the scheme should be secure.

We then analyze the scheme mathematically as black-box algorithms that take some (public or secret) input and give some (public or secret) output, and prove that it is secure concerning the algorithm description and the public data.

# Black Box Crypto

However, security depends on your model. In practice, it matters how these algorithms are implemented and what kind of information the *physical* system leaks about the inner workings of the algorithm computing on secret data.

# Black Box Crypto

However, security depends on your model. In practice, it matters how these algorithms are implemented and what kind of information the *physical* system leaks about the inner workings of the algorithm computing on secret data.

**Q:** What kind of information do you think might leak?

# Leakage

# Leakage

- ▶ The time it takes to compute

# Leakage

- ▶ The time it takes to compute
- ▶ The power usage while computing

# Leakage

- ▶ The time it takes to compute
- ▶ The power usage while computing
- ▶ The electromagnetic radiation...

# Leakage

- ▶ The time it takes to compute
- ▶ The power usage while computing
- ▶ The electromagnetic radiation...
- ▶ The temperature increase...



# Leakage

- ▶ The time it takes to compute
- ▶ The power usage while computing
- ▶ The electromagnetic radiation...
- ▶ The temperature increase...
- ▶ The memory pattern accessed...

# Leakage

- ▶ The time it takes to compute
- ▶ The power usage while computing
- ▶ The electromagnetic radiation...
- ▶ The temperature increase...
- ▶ The memory pattern accessed...
- ▶ The sounds your laptop makes...

# Researchers crack the world's toughest encryption by listening to the tiny sounds made by your computer's CPU

Security researchers have successfully broken one of the most secure encryption algorithms, 4096-bit RSA, by listening -- yes, with a microphone -- to a computer as it decrypts some encrypted data. The attack is fairly simple and can be carried out with rudimentary hardware. The repercussions for the average computer user are minimal, but if you're a secret agent, power user, or some other kind of encryption-using miscreant, you may want to reach for the Rammstein when decrypting your data.

By Sebastian Anthony December 18, 2013



**Figure:** <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/857.pdf>

# Examples

# Examples

- ▶ Credit cards connecting to ATMs

# Examples

- ▶ Credit cards connecting to ATMs
- ▶ Applications sharing resources

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- ▶ Credit cards connecting to ATMs
- ▶ Applications sharing resources
- ▶ Some publicly available crypto API

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# Examples

- ▶ Credit cards connecting to ATMs
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- ▶ Cloud key management systems

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# Side-Channel Attacks

Side-channel attacks (SCA) are attacks that exploits *physical leakage* in an implemented scheme to break the underlying cryptography, that is, by extracting the secret keys.

We can categorize the attacks in several different ways.

**Q:** Can you, based on the list of leakage, imagine how?

# Side-Channel Attacks

# Side-Channel Attacks

- ▶ Remote vs physical attacks

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- ▶ Remote vs physical attacks
- ▶ Software and hardware attacks

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- ▶ Remote vs physical attacks
- ▶ Software and hardware attacks
- ▶ Passive vs active attacks



# Side-Channel Attacks

- ▶ Remote vs physical attacks
- ▶ Software and hardware attacks
- ▶ Passive vs active attacks
- ▶ Invasive vs non-invasive attacks

# Remote vs Physical Attacks

Some side-channel attacks can be executed **remotely**, given information about how the algorithm is computed and access to timings or remotely shared sound.

For example decryption or signing queries online (remote server or WLAN) or sound through a feed (e.g. video call).

# Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems

Paul C. Kocher

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E-mail: [paul@cryptography.com](mailto:paul@cryptography.com).

**Abstract.** By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operations, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. Against a vulnerable system, the attack is computationally inexpensive and often requires only known ciphertext. Actual systems are potentially at risk, including cryptographic tokens, network-based cryptosystems, and other applications where attackers can make reasonably accurate timing measurements. Techniques for preventing the attack for RSA and Diffie-Hellman are presented. Some cryptosystems will need to be revised to protect against the attack, and new protocols and algorithms may need to incorporate measures to prevent timing attacks.

**Keywords:** timing attack, cryptanalysis, RSA, Diffie-Hellman, DSS.

**Figure:** <https://www.rambus.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/TimingAttacks.pdf>

## Remote Timing Attacks are Practical

David Brumley  
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Dan Boneh  
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dabo@cs.stanford.edu

**Figure:**

<https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf>


# Software vs Hardware Attacks

Some algorithms are computed in software and others in hardware, e.g., specialized circuits for computing AES or RSA.

This might impact memory allocation and SCA protection.

# Passive vs Active Attacks

Some attacks are possible just by **listening** for information leakage, while other attacks requires the adversary to take a more active role, e.g., by creating **(adaptive) queries**.



**Figure:** One power trace might reveal the whole key

# Differential Power Analysis

Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun

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<http://www.cryptography.com>

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**Abstract.** Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

**Keywords:** differential power analysis, DPA, SPA, cryptanalysis, DES

**Figure:**

<https://paulkocher.com/doc/DifferentialPowerAnalysis.pdf>



# Invasive vs Non-Invasive Attacks

An adversary that only measure time, power consumption or electromagnetic radiation is **non-invasive**.

An active adversary with physical access to the device might apply **semi-invasive** attacks using heat or lasers to interfere with the execution of programs (without destroying it).

An active adversary with physical access to the device might apply **(potentially) invasive** attacks by opening the chip to probe the circuitry in the silicon itself to reveal secrets.

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# Checking Passwords

```
1 def isCorrectPassword(pw, user_input):
2     if len(pw) != len(user_input):
3         return False
4
5     for i in range(len(pw)):
6         if pw[i] != user_input[i]:
7             return False
8
9     return True
```

**Figure: Q:** What can go wrong here?

# Cracking Passwords

Possible vulnerabilities:

- ▶ The time depends on password length
- ▶ The time depends on correct guesses
- ▶ The attacker has unlimited trials

**Protection:** The time it takes to check must be independent of secrets, and we must rate-limit the number of trials.

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# SCA Protection

# SCA Protection

- ▶ Constant time (secret independent) code

# SCA Protection

- ▶ Constant time (secret independent) code
- ▶ Randomization of (secret) computation



# SCA Protection

- ▶ Constant time (secret independent) code
- ▶ Randomization of (secret) computation
- ▶ Fault injection protection mechanisms

# SCA Protection

- ▶ Constant time (secret independent) code
- ▶ Randomization of (secret) computation
- ▶ Fault injection protection mechanisms
- ▶ Many other measurements...


## FIPS 140-3

# Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules



**Date Published:** March 22, 2019

**Supersedes:** [FIPS 140-2 \(12/03/2002\)](#)

**Planning Note (05/01/2019):** 

See the [FIPS 140-3 Transition](#) project for the following information:

- [FIPS 140-3 Transition Schedule](#)
- Supporting [SP 800-140x documents](#) that modify requirements of ISO/IEC 19790:2012 and ISO/IEC 24759:2017

### Author(s)

National Institute of Standards and Technology

**Figure:** <https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/140-3/final>

# Dude, is my code constant time?

Oscar Reparaz, Josep Balasch and Ingrid Verbauwhede  
KU Leuven/COSIC and imec  
Leuven, Belgium

**Figure:** <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1123.pdf>

# Comparative Study of ECC Libraries for Embedded Devices

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**Figure:** <https://tjerandsilde.no/files/Comparative-Study-of-ECC-Libraries-for-Embedded-Devices.pdf>

# Questions?